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Heap Graph Based Software Theft Detection
Patrick P. F. Chan, Student Member, IEEE, Lucas C. K. Hui, Senior Member, IEEE, and S. M. Yiu, Member, IEEE
Abstract—As JavaScript is becoming more and more popular,
JavaScript programs are valuable assets to many companies. How-
ever, the source code of JavaScript programs can be easily ob-
tained and plagiarism of JavaScript programs is a serious threat
to the industry. There are techniques like code obfuscation and
watermarking which can make the source code of a program dif-
ficult to understand by humans and prove the ownership of the
program. However, code obfuscation cannot avoid the source code
being copied and a watermark can be defaced. In this paper, we
use a relatively new technique, software birthmark, to help detect
code theft of JavaScript programs. A birthmark is a unique char-
acteristic a program possesses that can be used to identify the pro-
gram. We extend two recent birthmark systems that extract the
birthmark of a software from the run-time heap. We propose a re-
designed system with improved robustness and performed exten-
sive experiments to justify the effectiveness and robustness of it.
Our evaluation based on 200 large-scale websites showed that our
birthmark system exhibits 100% accuracy. We remark that it is
solid and ready for practical use.
Index Terms—Code theft detection, heap graph, software birth-
mark, software protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
D UE TO the prevalence of Web 2.0 and the fact thatHTML5 and JavaScript will become the first class
platform for the development of Windows 8 apps, it is not
surprising that JavaScript has become and will continue to be
the world’s most popular programming language. According
to a survey from Evans Data in 2008, over 60% of developers
use JavaScript and that usage has outstripped all 3GL and
scripting language use, including Java [1]. However, the source
code of JavaScript programs can be readily obtained as it
is an interpreted language and major browsers provide very
handy methods to get the source code of the web pages. As a
result, it is very hard to protect the intellectual property right of
JavaScript developers.
Software protection continues to be an important topic for
computer scientists. Watermarking is one of the well-known
and earliest approaches to detect software piracy in which a wa-
termark is incorporated into a program to prove the ownership
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of it [2], [3]. However, it is believed that “a sufficiently deter-
mined attacker will eventually be able to defeat any watermark.”
[4]. Watermarking also requires the owner to take extra action
(embed the watermark into the software) prior to releasing the
software. Thus, some existing JavaScript developers do not use
watermarking but try to obfuscate their source code before pub-
lishing. Code obfuscation is a semantics-preserving transforma-
tion of the source code that makes it more difficult to understand
and reverse engineer [5]. However, it only prevents others from
learning the logic of the source code but does not protect them
from being copied.
A relatively new but less popular software theft detection
technique is software birthmark. Software birthmark does not
require any code being added to the software. It depends solely
on the intrinsic characteristics of a program to determine the
similarity between two programs [6]–[13]. It was shown in
[7] that a birthmark could be used to identify software theft
even after destroying the watermark by code transformation.
According to Wang et al. [6], a birthmark is a unique charac-
teristic a program possesses that can be used to identify the
program. To detect software theft, the birthmark of the program
under protection (the plaintiff program) is first extracted. The
suspected program is then searched against the birthmark. If
the birthmark is found, it is highly likely that the suspected
program (or part of it) is a copy of the plaintiff program. There
are two categories of software birthmarks, static birthmarks
and dynamic birthmarks. Static birthmarks are extracted from
the syntactic structure of a program [10], [12], [13]. Dynamic
birthmarks are extracted from the dynamic behavior of a
program at run-time [6]–[9], [11]. Since semantics-preserving
transformations like code obfuscation only modify the syn-
tactic structure of a program but not the dynamic behavior of
it, dynamic birthmarks are more robust against them.
Previously, dynamic birthmarks make use of the complete
control flow trace, the API call trace, or the system call trace
obtained during the execution of a program [6]–[9], [11]. Birth-
marks based on the control flow trace may still be vulnerable to
obfuscation attack such as loop transformation. The ones based
on the API (system) call trace may suffer the problem of not
having enoughAPI (system) calls to make the birthmark unique.
Recently, birthmarks based on the run-time heap have been pro-
posed [14], [15]. However, the evaluation of these birthmarks
are based on a small number of tiny programs. Moreover, the
birthmark comparison algorithm proposed in [14] does not scale
up well and limits the size of the birthmark. The graph isomor-
phism used in [15] makes the birthmark vulnerable to what we
call reference injection attack.
This paper proposes a redesigned heap graph based birthmark
for JavaScript to make it a scalable and robust solution for de-
tecting software theft. The proposed birthmark is formed by ex-
tracting objects from the heap and building a heap graph out of
1556-6013/$31.00 © 2012 IEEE
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them. A heap graph is a simple directed graph inwhich the nodes
represent the objects and the edges represent the references be-
tween them. Since not all the objects and references stem from
the software itself, further filtering on them is performed to let
us focus on objects and references that truly represent the be-
havior of the software. The first kind of nodes filtered out are
those that are created by the browser. They include, among the
others, the objects that are created for the DOM tree and clo-
sures of JavaScript builtin functions. The second kind of nodes
filtered out are those that are not accessible from the JavaScript
program. For references, only the references created for con-
text variables are filtered as they are not accessible from the
JavaScript program. The filtered graph forms the birthmark of
the program.
To detect whether a website is using the plaintiff program, we
search for the birthmark of it, which is the filtered heap graph,
in the heap graph of the suspected website. We make use of sub-
graph monomorphism algorithm to do the searching. Subgraph
monomorphism is different from subgraph isomorphism that the
mapping needs not to be surjective. That means a pattern graph
is mapped to a subgraph in the base graph even if there exist
some edges in that subgraph that do not appear in the pattern
graph. The advantage of this is that even if the thieve, in a at-
tempt to escape from detection, deliberately adds some garbage
references between the objects, the birthmark of the plaintiff
program can still be identified.
We tested our solution using two commodity JavaScript
frameworks, Prototype [16] and MooTools [17], and success-
fully detected uses of them in 200 websites without any false
positives or false negatives. We also applied semantics-pre-
serving obfuscation on the two frameworks and compared
the birthmark of the original version and the birthmark of
the obfuscated version. We found that there is no difference
between them. This shows that our birthmark is robust against
obfuscation attack which is the commonly considered attack in
the literature.
The primary contributions of this paper are:
• Algorithm. We redesign the heap graph birthmark for
JavaScript to improve its scalability and its robustness
against reference injection attack. We propose a pruning
mechanism on the nodes and edges based on its nature to
filter out those that are not representing the unique char-
acteristics of the program concerned. For the detection
step, we make use of graph monomorphism to avoid false
negatives resulting from additional references injected
into the suspected program.
• Evaluation.We implement a prototype of the proposed ap-
proach and use the tool to scan 200 large-scale websites
from the wild. We demonstrate that our prototype system
successfully detected the uses of two JavaScript frame-
works in those websites with zero false positive rate and
zero false negative rate. We remark this is the first large
scale evaluation of a birthmark algorithm. This shows that
our birthmark algorithm is ready for practical use.
• A Scalable Implementation. We fully automate every
step of the prototype system to make it scalable. It took
less than an hour to finish checking all the 200 websites in
our testing set. Moreover, we provide an analysis of the
situations in which the birthmark detection step will take
substantially longer.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides some background information of software birthmark;
Section III formulates the threat model in which our system is
designed; Section IV provides the details of the design of our
system; Section V reports the evaluation results; Section VI
discusses the limitations and future work. Section VII surveys
related work and compares it with our work; Section VIII
concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section first provides the definition of dynamic birth-
marks to ease further discussion. We borrow part of the def-
inition from Tamada et al. [9]. It is the first formal definition
appearing in the literature and has been restated in subsequent
papers related to dynamic software birthmark. After that, the
definitions of subgraph monomorphism and -monomorphism
are given. Finally, the formal definition of an HG birthmark is
introduced.
A. Software Birthmarks
A software birthmark is a group of unique characteristics ex-
tracted from a program that can uniquely identify the program.
There are two categories of software birthmarks: static birth-
marks and dynamic birthmarks. We focus on dynamic birth-
marks in this research.
1) Dynamic Birthmarks: A dynamic birthmark is one that is
extracted when the program is executing. In other words, it is
an abstraction of the run-time behavior of the program. There-
fore, semantics-preserving transformations of the code like ob-
fuscation cannot defeat dynamic birthmarks. It is a generally ac-
cepted fact that dynamic birthmarks are more robust compared
with static birthmarks.
Definition 1: (Dynamic Birthmark) Let , be two programs
or program components. Let be an input to and . Let
be a set of characteristics extracted from when executing
with input . is a dynamic birthmark of only if both of
the following criteria are satisfied:
1) is obtained only from itself when executing
with input
2) program is a copy of
This definition is basically the same as that of static birth-
marks except that the birthmark is extracted with respect to a
particular input .
Next, we will discuss about subgraph monomorphism which
is the technique we use to perform detection of a birthmark in a
program.
B. Subgraph Monomorphism
Definition 2: (Graph Monomorphism) A graph monomor-
phism from a graph to a graph
is a bijective function such that
.
For comparison purpose, we also give the definition of graph
isomorphism as follows.
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Fig. 1. Example heap graph obtained from the JavaScript heap of www.gmail.com. (Limited to 100 nodes.)
Fig. 2. Example heap graph obtained from the JavaScript heap of www.apple.com. (Limited to 100 nodes.)
Definition 3: (Graph Isomorphism) A graph isomorphism
from a graph to a graph is
a bijective function such that
.
The only difference between graph isomorphism and graph
monomorphism is that for graph monomorphism, the mapping
needs not to be surjective. That means a pattern graph is mapped
to a subgraph in the base graph even if there exist some edges
in that subgraph that do not appear in the pattern graph. We use
graph monomorphism instead of graph isomorphism because
we want to avoid false negatives when there exist some edges
in the base graph (the heap graph of the suspected program) that
do not appear in the pattern graph (the heap graph of the plaintiff
program). This technique, what we call reference injection at-
tack, can be easily exploited by the software thief in an attempt
to escape from being detected. Since a graph monomorphism
can be found even if there exist such references (edges) in the
heap graph of the suspected program, reference injection attack
will not hinder the detection of software theft.
Definition 4: (Subgraph monomorphism) A subgraph
monomorphism from a graph to a graph
is a bijective function such that is
a graph monomorphism from to a subgraph .
Definition 5: ( -monomorphism) A graph is -monomor-
phic to if there exists a subgraph such that is sub-
graph monomorphic to , and .
C. Heap Graph Based Birthmark
Before we give the definition of our heap graph based birth-
mark (HGB), we need to define what a heap graph (HG) is. An
HG is a directed graph representation of the “points-to” relation
between JavaScript objects in the JavaScript heap. The formal
definition of a heap graph is given as follows.
Definition 6: (HG: Heap Graph) The heap graph of a program
run is a 2-tuple graph , where
• is a set of nodes, and a node corresponds to an
object in the JavaScript heap.
• is the set of edges, and each edge
corresponds to a reference between the object
represented by node and the object represented by node
. There is no duplicated edge between two nodes.
Figs. 1 and 2 shows two examples of heap graphs extracted
from www.gmail.com and www.apple.com respectively. The
graphs are printed out in the course of depth first search tra-
versals of the objects in the JavaScript heap following the
references between them. We limit the number of nodes to 100
to make the size of the graphs suitable for presentation. There
are three attributes in each node: node name, node type, and
node ID. Node name is the name of the object and node ID is
a unique ID assigned to that object. Each edge is also marked
by its type. We will explain further about the node type and
edge type in Section IV when we talk about the design of our
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Fig. 3. System overview.
birthmark. Basically, a heap graph starts with a root node with
its child nodes representing the DOM windows of the web
pages embedded in it.
Based on the -monomorphism definition and the definition
of a heap graph we just provided, the HG birthmark can be de-
fined.
Definition 7: (HGB: Heap Graph based Birthmark) Let ,
be two programs or program components. Let be an input to
and , and , be heap graphs of the program runs with
input for , respectively. A subgraph of the graph is
HG birthmark of , , if both of the following criteria are
satisfied:
• program or program component is in a copy relation with
is subgraph monomorphic to .
• program or program component is not in a copy relation
with is not subgraph monomorphic to .
Although our experiment showed that HGB is robust to
state-of-the-art obfuscation techniques, we relax subgraph
monomorphism to -monomorphism in our detection for
robustness to unobserved and unexpected attacks. Hence, a
program is regarded as a copy of another program if the
HGB of is -monomorphic to HGB of . We set in
experiments since we believe that overhauling 10% of an HGB
is almost equivalent to changing the overall architecture of a
program component.
III. THREAT MODEL
We are focusing on library theft for large scale programs. Our
threat model is similar to the one stated in [15].
In the attack scenario, Bob is the owner of a program . The
core part of it is a library which is also developed by him.
Alice wants to write another program Q which has similar func-
tionalities as does. Obtaining a copy of program , Alice
reverse engineers it and gets the source code. She extracts the
library from program and uses it in her own program Q.
In order to escape from code theft detection, she obfuscates the
source code before compilation.
Later, Bob discovers that the program developed by Alice
functions similarly to his own program . He wants to find out
if program uses the library developed by him. Since the
source code of program is obfuscated and illegible, he cannot
justify it by reverse engineering program and looking at the
source code. He then gets help from our dynamic birthmark
system. He executes program and gets the birthmark with re-
spect to library . After that, he executes program and gets
the birthmark of the whole program . Obtaining the birthmark
with respect to library , , and the heap graph of the
whole program , , he then finds out whether is
Fig. 4. Heap profile of GMail initialization phase.
-subgraph monomorphic to or not to identify code theft
of library .
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN
Fig. 3 shows the overview of our birthmark system. It out-
lines the processes that the plaintiff program and the suspected
program undergo. The JavaScript heap profiler runs a JavaScript
program and takes multiple heap snapshots in the course of its
execution. The graph generator and filter traverses the objects
in the heap snapshots and builds heap graphs out of them. It
also filters out objects according to our design decisions that we
will discuss later in this section. The graph merger merges the
filtered heap graphs together to form one single graph. The sub-
graph selector selects a subgraph from the heap graph to form
the birthmark of the plaintiff program. This step is not needed
for the suspected program. Finally, the detector searches for the
birthmark of the plaintiff program in the heap graph of the sus-
pected program. In this section, we will discuss each of these
processes and state the rationales behind our design.
A. Javascript Heap Profiler
Being an interpreted language, JavaScript allows for the cre-
ation of objects at anytime. On the other head, one of the design
elements of the V8 JavaScript engine is efficient garbage col-
lection. As a result, the JavaScript heap keeps changing due to
object creations and garbage collections. Fig. 4 shows a heap
profile of the initialization phase (first 10 sec) of GMail. We ob-
serve that the number of objects is increasing in the early stage.
Later on, there are some drops and it eventually stabilizes after
a while.
To make full use of the behavior exhibited by the objects in
the heap, we try to capture every object that appears in the heap.
In order to achieve this, we need to avoid missing those objects
that disappear from the heap due to garbage collection. There-
fore, the JavaScript heap profiler in our design takes multiple
dumps of the heap and merges them together later on.
After kicking off the JavaScript program, the browser keeps
dumping the JavaScript heap in every 2 seconds. Since taking a
snapshot will actually trigger a garbage collection, we make the
heap of the browser larger to delay garbage collection and dump
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the heap more frequently hoping that every object is captured
before it becomes garbage.
B. Graph Generator and Filter
Since we make use of the Chromium browser [18] to dump
out the JavaScript heap in our prototype system, the following
discussion is in the context of V8 JavaScript Engine [19], which
is the JavaScript engine that powers the Chromium browser.
For each snapshot taken using the Chromium browser, we
perform a death first search traversal of it and print out the heap
graph with nodes and edges that pass a filter. We describe such
a filter in details as follows.
Objects in the V8 JavaScript heap are divided into six cat-
egories: INTERNAL, ARRAY, STRING, OBJECT, CODE, and
CLOSURE. We do not include in our heap graph objects that
belong to INTERNAL, ARRAY, STRING, and CODE categories.
The reasons behind this design decision are as follows: IN-
TERNAL objects are virtual objects for housekeeping purpose
and are not accessible from the program code. For Array
objects, they represent an array of elements objects. However,
our observation shows that arrays are actually represented by
an object of the type OBJECT with name “Array” and the
references from the array are coming out from that object.
Therefore, ARRAY objects are not included. For STRING and
CODE objects, there is no reference coming out from them.
Therefore, they are not included as well. To sum up, we only
include in our heap graph OBJECT and CLOSURE objects.
They are JavaScript objects and function closures respectively.
References between objects in the V8 JavaScript heap are
divided into 4 categories: CONTEXT_VARIABLE, ELEMENT,
PROPERTY, and INTERNAL. We do not include in our heap
graph references that below to CONTEXT_VARIABLE and IN-
TERNAL categories. The reasons behind this design decision are
as follows: CONTEXT_VARIABLE is a variable in a function
context, accessible by its name from inside a function closure.
Therefore, it is not accessible by objects outside that function
and it is automatically created by V8 for housekeeping purpose.
INTERNAL references are properties added by the JavaScript
virtual machine. They are not accessible from JavaScript code.
Therefore, we only include in our heap graph ELEMENT and
PROPERTY references. ELEMENT references are regular prop-
erties with numeric indices, accessed via [] (brackets) notation
and PROPERTY references are regular properties with names,
accessed via the . (dot) operator, or via [] (brackets) notation.
There are some objects created by the JavaScript engine that
exist not just for one program. For example, the HTMLDocu-
ment object can be found in the heap graphs of all the JavaScript
programs we studied. Therefore, we need to filter such objects
out as they dilute the uniqueness of the heap graph. Basically,
the filtered objects include objects created to represent the DOM
tree and function closure objects for JavaScript builtin func-
tions.
The output of the graph generator and filter is a set of filtered
heap graphs captured at different points of time. In the next step,
we are going to merge these graphs together to form a single
graph which embraces all the information gathered in the heap
graphs.
C. Graph Merger
There is a unique ID assigned to every object in the JavaScript
heap by the V8 JavaScript engine. Moreover, the ID of an ob-
ject does not change across multiple dumps and therefore, can
be used to identify the object. The Graph Generator and Filter
also annotates each node in the heap graph with its object ID.
Therefore, we can tell whether or not two nodes in two heap
graphs refer to the same object.
The graph merger takes multiple heap graphs as input and
outputs a superimposition of them (one single graph) that
includes all the nodes and edges appearing in the input heap
graphs. The algorithm of graph merger is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Calculate superimposition of a set of labelled
connected graphs
Require: connected graphs , labelling
function where and is a positive integer
Ensure: is connected and is a superimposition of
graphs in G with labelling function where
and is a positive integer





In a nutshell, it superimposes all the graphs one by one by
taking the union set of the nodes and edges of the two graphs
being merged. In order to make the resulting superimposition
graph also connected, we need to ensure that there is at least
one object in common (with the same object ID) in two graphs
before superimposing them.
D. Subgraph Selector
After going through the above steps, the resulting heap graph
is one that contains custom objects only and can be used to iden-
tify the JavaScript program. However, we cannot use the entire
graph as the birthmark of the program since the graph is too
large for the subgraph monomorphism tool, VFLib, we use [20].
In fact, the subgraph monomorphism problem itself is known to
be NP-complete. The graph, which can comprise hundreds of
nodes, is too large for the algorithm and may lead to very long
execution time.
To explain the method we use to select the subgraph to be
used as the birthmark, we need to first study about the struc-
ture of the heap graph. A heap graph starts with a virtual node
which is the entry point to all the nodes in the heap. The virtual
node points to one or moreWindow objects which represents the
different DOM windows residing on the web page. A Window
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Fig. 5. Structure of a heap graph.
object in turn points to the various objects in its DOM window.
Fig. 5 shows the structure of a heap graph.
We look at all the objects under the Window nodes and com-
pare their sizes in terms of the number of nodes and number of
edges reachable from the nodes of them. We select the largest
object and the subgraph reachable from it to be the birthmark as
that captures the most information of the heap.
E. Detector
The detector takes the subgraph from the plaintiff program
and the entire heap graph of the suspected program as inputs
and determines whether the selected subgraph of the plaintiff
program can be found in the heap graph of the suspected pro-
gram.
Similar to what is done by the subgraph selector, it takes sub-
graphs of the objects under the Window objects from the sus-
pected program and uses subgraph monomorphism to check
whether the subgraph of the plaintiff program can be found in
them. Once there is a match found, the detector raises an alert
and reports where the match is found.
V. EVALUATION
In order to evaluate our method, we built a prototype of our
birthmark system and used it to detect the uses of two JavaScript
frameworks in 200 websites. In this section, we first discuss
about the implementation of our prototype system. Following
that, we present the evaluation results.
A. Implementation
Our prototype system consists of two modules. The first
module is a modified chromium browser coupled with a
browser extension. It plays the role of the JavaScript Heap
Profiler and the Graph Generator and Filter. The second module
consists of some C++ programs that play the role of the Graph
Merger, the Subgraph Selector, and the Detector. The entire
prototype runs under Mac OSX 10.7.3 and comprises 750 LOC.
1) First Module: We make use of the HeapProfiler API
provided by the V8 JavaScript engine to take snapshots of the
JavaScript heap. The snapshots provided are in the form of
heap graphs accessible via the virtual nodes. We modified the
Chromium browser such that it calls HeapProfiler to take a
snapshot of the heap every time a dumpHeap function is called
from the JavaScript program. HeapProfiler takes 5 steps to take
a snapshot. The first step is to trigger two garbage collections
in order to ensure that all objects, including weakly reachable
ones, are reachable from the root. The second step is to iterate
heap contents to count entries and references. The third step is
to fill references between the entries. The forth step is to set
the dominators of the entries. The dominator of an object A is
an object that exists in every simple path from the root to the
object A. The final step is to calculate the retained size of each
entry (the total size of the entries reachable from that entry,
including itself). The snapshot taken is then printed out to a
text file.
To print out a heap graph, we traverse it starting from the
virtual node. Since we need to filter out nodes and edges that do
not represent the unique behavior of the program as mentioned
in Section IV, we selectively skip the nodes and edges that need
to be filtered out during the traversal.
Since the heap snapshot taking is triggered by the dumpHeap
function call from the JavaScript program, we need to insert it
into the JavaScript program being investigated transparently. To
do this, we develop a simple browser extension that inserts a
code snippet into web pages the modified browser visits. The
extension is built using a technique called Content Scripts [21].
Content scripts are JavaScript files that run in the context of web
pages. They can read details of the web pages the browser visits,
or make changes to them. We set the script to be run at docu-
ment_idle such that the browser chooses a time to inject scripts
between the time when the DOM is complete and immediately
after the window.onload event fires. This allows us to ensure
that the snapshot taking does not start before the document is
fully loaded and the objects are created. The code snippet in-
serted calls the dumpHeap function in every 2 seconds.
There is one set of text files, storing the multiple snapshots
taken, generated for each object under theWindow nodes. Each
text file represents the subgraph that contains all the nodes and
references accessible from the object.
2) Second Module: The second module is a bunch of C++
programs and shellscripts that do the various tasks. The graph
merger is based on the graph superimposition algorithm men-
tioned in Section IV. It takes text files representing the same
object and merges them together. The output of it is a single text
file that contains the graph of the superimposition of the object
subgraphs.
The subgraph selector sorts the text files storing the object
subgraphs by size and selects the largest file to become the birth-
mark. It is because the object subgraph stored in the largest file
has the largest total number of nodes and edges.
For the detector, it takes the largest object graph from the
plaintiff program and tries to search for it in the object graphs
of the suspected program. We make use of the VFLib library
[20] which provides the subgraph monomorphism algorithm to
do the searching. Once there is a match found, the detector re-
ports the object subgraph of the suspected program in which the
birthmark is found.
B. Evaluation Results
1) Effectiveness: We chose two subject JavaScript libraries
for experiments: Prototype [16] and MooTools [17]. They are
JavaScript frameworks that aim to ease development of dy-
namic web applications. Their birthmarks are shown in Figs. 6
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Fig. 6. Heap graph of Prototype version 1.7.
Fig. 7. Heap graph of MooTools version 1.4.5.
and 7 respectively. Our testing program set consists of 200 web-
sites divided into two groups. The first group consists of 81 web-
sites and the second group consists of 119 websites. The two
groups of websites were reported having used the Prototype
framework and the MooTools framework respectively.
To extract the birthmarks of the two JavaScript frameworks,
we created simple web pages with the JavaScript files of dif-
ferent versions of the two frameworks embedded in them. For
prototype, we focused on versions starting from 1.6.0. For
MooTools, we focused on versions starting from 1.3.0. We
browsed the web pages using our modified Chromium browser
coupled with the extension that takes heap snapshots. We then
TABLE I
EVALUATION RESULTS
obtained the birthmarks of the various testing libraries. Next,
we ran our prototype system to try to find the birthmarks of
Prototype library in the first group of testing websites and
find the birthmarks of MooTools library in the second group
of testing websites. We discovered that some websites do not
have the birthmarks in them. For the first group of websites,
our system detected the birthmarks of Prototype library in 21
of them only. For the second group of websites, our system
detected the birthmarks of MooTools library in 25 of them
only.
To justify the results, we manually checked the existence of
the two libraries in their corresponding groups of websites. We
checked the existence of the Prototype library by searching for
the phrase “var Prototype” in the code base of the websites as
we found that this phrase appears in the source code of all ver-
sions of it. Similarly, we checked the existence of the MooTools
library by searching for the phrase “MooTools={version” in the
code base of the websites. Our manual checking results are the
same as the results given by the detector. We conclude that the
accuracy of our birthmark system is 100% for the two libraries.
Table I summarizes our evaluation results of this section.
2) Robustness: Defacing the birthmark so as to escape from
detection is the major goal of software birthmarks attackers. The
commonly used technique is code obfuscation which is a seman-
tics-preserving transformation of the source code. In order to
test the robustness of our birthmark system, we applied code ob-
fuscation to the source code of the different versions of the two
JavaScript frameworks we used and saw the difference between
the birthmarks of the original frameworks and the birthmarks of
the obfuscated frameworks. The obfuscator we used is Jasob 3
[22]. It is a state-of-the-art obfuscation tool for JavaScript used
by hundreds of companies and individuals to protect and opti-
mize their web content. It replaces descriptive variable and func-
tion names with meaningless names. We found that the there
is no difference between the two sets of birthmarks. Therefore,
our birthmark system is robust against this kind of code obfus-
cation attack. In fact, our system is robust against any obfusca-
tions that do not change the referencing structure of heap ob-
jects. In Section VI, we will discuss about potential attacks to
our system.
3) Performance: Since our birthmark system will be used to
search for the birthmark of the protected software component
among numerous software, execution performance is a critical
requirement. In light of this, all the processes of the system are
automated. We used our system to analyze 200 websites with
most of them being large-scale (e.g., apple.com, cnet.com, nasa.
gov, etc). And the analysis of all of them only took less than an
hour. That is to say, each website only took less than 18 seconds
on average. And the whole analysis was done in a batch.
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VI. DISCUSSION
A. Limitations
Since our birthmark system relays on the referencing struc-
ture between objects, the program under protection is required
to have a significant referencing structure that can be used to
uniquely identify it. The target of our system is large scale
programs which usually exercise the object oriented pro-
gramming paradigm. We observed, however, that some large
scale programs are simply procedural and our system is not
suitable for them. One of such examples is the jQuery library
which does not have a prominent referencing structure. We
observed that it mainly consists of procedures encapsulated in
the jQuery object. However, we do see the trend that programs
are becoming more and more object-oriented. For example,
earlier versions of MooTools are not as object-oriented as
newer versions of MooTools. We observed that the size of the
heap graph of MooTools is strictly increasing along with the
updates. The same is also true for the Prototype library.
Another limitation of our system is that graph monomor-
phism we use at the detection step is NP-complete. Although
it was designed to handle large graphs (up to 2–3000 nodes),
the pruning step fails if the graphs exhibit strong symmetries,
for example if they are almost completely connected or they
are mostly in tree structures as studied in [23]. In that case,
the running time becomes very long and it is not practical to
be used. We did not come across this situation throughout our
study though.
B. Potential Attacks
There are 3 kinds of potential attacks to our birthmark system.
We are going to discuss them one by one in this section.
1) Object/Reference Injection: The attacker can inject ob-
jects or references that are of no use into the program. There will
be addition nodes and edges on the resulting heap graph. How-
ever, the attacker can only control the base graph but not the
pattern graph. The base graph is the heap graph extracted from
the suspected program and the pattern graph is the heap graph
extracted from the plaintiff program. Since subgraph monomor-
phism is used in our detection system, the extra nodes and edges
on the base graph will not affect the matching of the pattern
graph. Therefore, our birthmark system is immune to this kind
of attack.
2) Object/Reference Removal: The attacker can purposely
remove classes or references from the program. The resulting
heap graph will have some nodes and edges missing. This will
make our detection system fail to detect the birthmark in the
suspected program. However, we argue that it is hard to remove
a class or reference while preserving the behavior of the pro-
gram. We can reasonably assume that such an attack is not fea-
sible in practice. If it is feasible, the design of the original pro-
gram is problematic as it contains some redundant classes or
redundant references between classes. As a last resort, we can
we relax subgraph monomorphism to -monomorphism to cap-
ture incomplete instances of the birthmark.
3) Class Refractoring: Class refractoring refers to the
process of restructuring classes. It is commonly used to
improve the design of object oriented programs. The two
underlying techniques that can bring an impact to the structure
of the heap graph, class coalescing and class splitting, have
been studied in a paper on obfuscation of design intent in
object-oriented programs [24]. Class coalescing refers to the
merging of two classes into one class. On the contrary, class
splitting refers to splitting a class into two classes. However, as
discussed in the paper, there are preconditions that need to be
satisfied before class coalescing and class splitting can be done
without changing the behavior of the obfuscated program.
For class coalescing, the two classes to be coalesced cannot
not extend different library classes. In their experiments, they
showed that only about 30% of classes on average are eligible
for coalescing. That result is for Java programs only. Since
JavaScript is a prototype-oriented programming language, the
challenge is even bigger as each object has a prototype chain
which is typically longer than the inheritance chain and com-
bining two classes means combining the prototype chain of the
two classes. Otherwise, some references may not be resolved
if some classes in the original prototype chain is missing. And
even if the two classes can be coalesced, every declaration of a
field, local variable, or method argument with type of the two
classes has to be replaced with the coalesced class. Finally,
their experiments showed that class coalescing results in a
significant run-time penalty.
For class splitting, dependencies amongmethods and fields of
the original class need to be considered. In general, conservative
dependency analysis is required when splitting a class. Further-
more, the authors believe that in practice, splitting a class into
two classes not related by inheritance or aggregation is possible
only in situations where the original design is flawed and, in-
stead of a single class, there should have been several different
classes. When splitting a class C into two classes C1 and C2,
C2 is made a subclass of C1. This has minimum effects on the
resulting heap graph as the node that represents the class C in
the original heap graph is now replaced by a node representing
C2. And since C2 is a subclass of C1, all the references con-
necting class C is now connecting class C2 instead. Therefore,
the structure of the heap graph is essentially the same.
C. Future Improvements
In this section, we describe future improvements that we hope
to see.
1) Improved Graph Selector: Currently, we choose the
largest object subgraph to become the birthmark of a program.
We do not know if there exists a better way to do it. One
preliminary idea is to use frequent subgraph mining to get
the frequent subgraph that appears in all the heap graphs we
extracted from the program. This can make the birthmark
more representative of the program. However, the running
time of frequent subgraph mining on large graphs is slow and
there should be some performance tuning in order for it to be
practical.
2) Faster Detector: Due to the theoretical running time limit
of graph monomorphism algorithm we used in our detector, we
need to limit the size of the heap graphs in order to control the
running time of the detector. This essentially has two effects on
our system. On one hand, this makes the birthmark capture less
CHAN et al.: HEAP GRAPH BASED SOFTWARE THEFT DETECTION 109
information from what is available. It is because there are ob-
jects and references that are useful for identifying the program
but missed in our heap graphs, they represent information loss.
On the other hand, this potentially makes our system miss some
alarms. It is because the sizes of the heap graphs of the sus-
pected programs are limited as well, it is possible that it makes
the birthmark incompletely captured in the heap graphs and ul-
timately leads to false negatives. Currently, we limit the size of
the pattern graph (the object subgraph of the plaintiff program)
to 20 nodes and that of the base graph (the object subgraph of
the suspected program) to 40 nodes.We find this gives us a good
balance between running time (less than few minutes for each
test) and detection accuracy (100% in our evaluation). Although
the current result is promising, we do hope to see ways to make
the detector even more efficient and allow us to feed the system
with larger heap graphs.
VII. RELATED WORK
The first dynamic birthmark was proposed by G. Myles
and C. Collberg [7]. They exploited the complete control flow
trace of a program execution to identify the program. They
showed that their technique was more resilient to attacks by
semantics-preserving transformations than published static
techniques. However, their work is still susceptible to various
loop transformations. Moreover, the whole program path traces
are large and make the technique not scalable.
Tamada et al. proposed two kinds of dynamic software birth-
marks based on API calls [9]. Their approach was based on the
insights that it was difficult for adversaries to alter the API calls
with other equivalent ones and that the compiler did not opti-
mize the APIs themselves. They extensively used runtime in-
formation of API calls as a strong signature of the program.
Through analyzing the execution order and the frequency distri-
bution of the API calls, they extracted dynamic birthmarks that
could distinguish individually developed same-purpose appli-
cations and were resilience to different compiler options. This
promising result led to subsequent researches on dynamic birth-
marks based on API calls.
Schuler et al. proposed a dynamic birthmark for Java that ob-
serves how a program uses objects provided by the Java Stan-
dard API [8]. The proposed API birthmark observes short se-
quences of method calls received by individual objects from
the Java Platform Standard API. By chopping up the call trace
into a set of short call sequences received by API objects, it is
easier to compare the more compact call sequences. Evaluation
performed by the authors showed that their dynamic birthmark
solution could accurately identify programs that were identical
to each other and differentiate distinct programs. Moreover, all
birthmarks of obfuscated programs were identical to that of the
original program. Most importantly, their API birthmark was
more scalable and more resilient than the WPP Birthmark by
Myles and Collberg [7].
Wang et al. proposed dependence graph based software
birthmark called SCDG birthmark [6]. An SCDG is a graph
representation of the dynamic behavior of a program, where
system calls are represented by vertices, and data and control
dependences between system calls are represented by edges.
The SCDG birthmark is a subgraph of the SCDG that can
identify the whole program. They implemented a prototype
of SCDG birthmark based software theft detection system.
Evaluation of their system showed that it was robust against
attacks based on different compiler options, different compilers
and different obfuscation techniques. It is the first system that
is able to detect software component theft where only partial
code is stolen.
We proposed the first dynamic birthmark based on the
run-time heap [14]. It is also the first dynamic birthmark for
JavaScript programs. The proposed birthmark is in the form of
an object reference tree. We used a tree comparison algorithm
to compare two birthmarks and gave a similarity score between
two birthmarks. However, due to efficiency problem of the tree
comparison algorithm, we needed to limit the depth of the tree
to 3 in order to make the running time of the algorithm practical.
On the other hand, our new birthmark is an object graph and
we use graph monomorphism to search for the birthmark in the
heap graph of the suspected program. Although we do limit
the size of the heap graphs in our new system, the limitation is
less restrictive. It is because the root node of the heap graph
is actually at level 2 of the whole object reference graph with
reference to the virtual node (which is considered the root node
of the whole heap graph in our previous work). Even though we
limit the size of the heap graph, the current birthmark captures
far more information than the previous system. Moreover, the
evaluation of this birthmark system is of much larger scale
(200 websites compared with 20 JavaScript programs in their
work) and the results are promising.
Later, we proposed another heap based birthmark system
[15]. This time, the birthmark system is for Java programs. We
also used a different algorithm, graph isomorphism, for birth-
mark detection. However, as pointed out earlier in this paper,
graph isomorphism is too restrictive and makes the birthmark
system vulnerable to reference injection attack. On the con-
trary, our new birthmark system uses graph monomorphism for
birthmark detection and this makes our system robust against
such attack. Besides, the scale of the evaluation of that system
is much smaller (25 programs compared with 200 websites in
this work). We remark that the scale of evaluation of our new
birthmark system is the largest so far.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a robust heap graph based soft-
ware birthmark system for JavaScript programs. We made our
birthmark robust against reference injection attacks and stream-
lined every process of the system to make it scalable. We eval-
uated our birthmark system using 200 large-scale websites and
the experiment results are promising with 100% accuracy. We
discussed the limitations of the system as well as the various po-
tential attacks. As JavaScript is getting more and more popular
nowadays and the source code of JavaScript programs can be
readily obtained, our birthmark system brings to the industry a
practical solution to protect their intellectual property right. Al-
though software birthmark is a relatively new and less focused
research area for the time being, we hope that our work can stir
up more discussions in the community and that will eventually
lead to even better work in the future.
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